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CaseNo.20090979-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
FRANKIE ARNOLD WHITE, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his conviction for assault, a class A misdemeanor 
enhanced to a third-degree felony because it was committed "in concert with 
two or more persons/' in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102(3) and 76-3-
203.1(3)(b) (West 2009). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).' 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Class A misdemeanor assault requires that a "person cause[] substantial 
bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(3)(a). "'Substantial bodily 
injury' means bodily injury . . . that creates or causes . . . temporary 
disfigurement." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(12). 
1
 Unless otherwise stated, all citations to the Utah Code are to the West 
2009 publication. 
Is a "two or three inch[]" facial scar, still visible five months after its 
infliction, "temporary disfigurement"? 
Standard of Review. Defendant frames the issue as a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence. But the claim, at bottom, is one of "statutory 
interpretation and therefore presents a question of law that [appellate courts] 
review for correctness." Heber Light & Power Co. v. Utah Public Service Comm'n, 
2010 UT 27, | 6, 231 P.3d 1203. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are attached in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Assault); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Aggravated Assault); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Definitions); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Offenses committed in concert with two or 
more persons — Notice — Enhanced penalties). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In August 2009, a jury convicted Defendant of one count of assault, a class 
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102. R. 1-4, 52; R. 
149:231. Defendant's conviction was enhanced to a third-degree felony under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 because the "offense was committed in concert 
-2-
with two or more persons/' R. 2; R. 149:231.2 The trial court sentenced 
Defendant to the statutory prison term of zero-to-five years, but suspended it 
favor of thirty-six months' probation, conditioned on a ninety-day jail term. R. 
137-138. Defendant timely appealed. R. 140-141. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March 2009, Dexter Thomas, an African American man, was riding 
TRAX, just "trying to mind [his] own business." R. 148:59,70-71. When Thomas 
got on the train, he saw Defendant and two other Caucasian men "start[ing] 
problems with the passengers." R. 148:42, 59-61. Defendant and his 
companions were swearing and calling other passengers "gay" and "fags." R. 
148:59,61,70-71. One of Defendant's companions kept asking Thomas, "Where 
do I know you from?" "What are you looking at?" and "Do you want to fight 
me?" R. 148:45-46, 61-62. 
Thomas and Defendant's threesome got off at the same station. R. 148:47, 
61-62. As the four stepped onto the platform, one of Defendant's companions 
continued to insist that he knew Thomas. R. 148:62. That companion then 
2
 Defendant was also convicted of failure to stop at the command of a law 
enforcement officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-305.5, but he does not challenge that conviction on appeal. See R. 1-4,52; R. 
149:231. 
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crossed the street with Defendant. R. 148:62,64; R. 149:167-168. But Defendant's 
other companion "got up in [Thomas7] face" and called him a "motherf—er 
nig—r." R. 148:62, 64-66, 90. The man "was getting his fists ready to try to hit 
[Thomas] in the face," when Thomas "pushed him" off the platform and into the 
street. R. 148:66,72-73,77\ 80,85-86,90; R. 149:174-175. Defendant and his other 
companion ran back across the street "like a pack of wolves," jumped onto the 
platform, and "maul[ed]" and "just attacked]" Thomas. R. 148:65,67-69,73-74, 
77
 f 80, 85-88,101-102,115-117,122-123. 
Thomas, who was "backing up" and "trying to get away," ended up "on 
the ground." R. 148:67, 69, 73, 116, 123. Defendant and his companions 
shouted, "kill that nig—r" as they repeatedly punched Thomas in the face, head, 
and chest. R. 148:67-68,79,88,102-103,115,117,122-123. The assault continued 
for "a good one or two minutes," and only stopped when "officers [came] to 
pull them off." R. 148:67-68. In addition to being "disoriented and upset," 
Thomas suffered a cut on the side of his face, resulting in "significant blood" 
and a "two or three inch[]" scar, still visible at trial five months later. R. 148:68, 
109-110. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to 
establish that the victim suffered "substantial bodily injury," as required for 
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class A misdemeanor assault. Defendant does not dispute, however, that the 
evidence established that the victim suffered a two-to-three-inch facial scar, still 
visible to the jury five months later at trial. Instead, Defendant contends that a 
two-to-three-inch facial scar does not, as a matter of law, amount to "temporary 
disfigurement/' and, therefore, "substantial bodily injury." Defendant's 
argument is without merit. 
According to the plain language of the statute, "substantial bodily injury" 
may be established by showing "temporary disfigurement." Black's Law 
Dictionary defines "temporary" as "transitory," and "disfigurement" as 
"impairment or injury to the appearance of a person." The Utah Legislature 
thus clearly intended that a two-to-three-inch facial scar, like the victim's here, 
fall within the statutory definition of "substantial bodily injury." 
Defendant nevertheless argues that the Legislature could not have 
intended for such a "slight" facial scar to amount to "substantial bodily injury." 
He supports this argument by comparing the statutory definition of "substantial 
bodily injury," required for class A misdemeanor assault, with the statutory 
definition of "serious bodily injury," required for second-degree felony 
aggravated assault. Whereas "substantial bodily injury" requires "temporary 
disfigurement," "serious bodily injury" requires "permanent disfigurement." 
Defendant contends that if the only difference between the two definitions is 
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temporary versus permanent, then any scar, no matter how slight, would 
always qualify for second-degree felony aggravated assault. Reasoning that the 
Legislature could not have intended this result, Defendant invites this Court to 
rewrite the statute by inserting the word "considerable" or "substantial" before 
"temporary disfigurement." 
Defendant's argument is based on a misreading of the statute. The 
difference between "substantial" and "serious" bodily injury is not merely 
"temporary" versus "permanent," as Defendant suggests. While class A 
misdemeanor assault requires only "temporary disfigurement," second-degree 
felony aggravated assault requires "serious permanent disfigurement." By 
including the modifier "serious" in the definition of "serious bodily injury," 
while excluding a similar modifier in the definition of "substantial bodily 
injury," the Legislature evinced a clear intent that all non-serious temporary 
disfigurements be punished as class A misdemeanor assaults. To insert the 
modifier "considerable" or "substantial" by judicial fiat would directly 
contravene that clear legislative intent. 
The Legislature also distinguished between the two crimes by mental 
state. Whereas class A misdemeanor assault requires only recklessness, second-
degree felony aggravated assault must be intentional. Thus, contrary to 
-6-
Defendant's claim, the same injury cannot be raised from "substantial" to 
" serious" bodily injury based solely on whether that injury is permanent. 
But even if this Court were to conclude that the victim's facial scar did 
not, as a matter of law, amount to substantial bodily injury, the remedy is not 
outright reversal, as Defendant suggests, but entry of a conviction for class B 
misdemeanor assault. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A TWO-TO-THREE-INCH FACIAL SCAR, STILL VISIBLE FIVE 
MONTHS AFTER ITS INFLICTION, CONSTITUTES 
TEMPORARY DISFIGUREMENT WITHIN THE STATUTORY 
DEFINITION OF SUBSTANTIAL BODILY INJURY 
Under Utah's statutory scheme, class B misdemeanor assault is an attempt 
or threat to cause, or an act that causes, substantial risk of or actual "bodily 
injury" to another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1). Class A misdemeanor 
assault, the basis for Defendant's conviction, is a class B misdemeanor assault 
which results in "substantial bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
102(3)(a). Aggravated assault, a second-degree felony, is an assault in which the 
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perpetrator "intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a).3 
Defendant claims that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient, as a 
matter of law, to support the substantial bodily injury element of the class A 
misdemeanor assault charge for which he was convicted. Apt. Br. 9-29. 
Defendant concedes, however, that the evidence established that the victim 
suffered a two-to-three-inch facial scar as a result of the assault. Nevertheless, 
he claims that a two-to-three-inch scar on a victim's face is not "substantial 
bodily injury," defined, in part, as "temporary disfigurement." Id. at 23-29. As 
explained below, a facial scar still visible five months after its infliction falls well 
within the statutory meaning of "temporary disfigurement," and, therefore, 
"substantial bodily injury." 
A. Under the plain language of the statute, a two-to-three-inch facial 
scar still visible five months after its infliction constitutes 
temporary disfigurement 
Although Defendant frames his argument as a sufficiency of the evidence 
claim, at bottom, it is a statutory construction claim. Apt. Br. 1. As explained, 
Defendant concedes that the victim suffered a facial scar still visible five months 
later at trial. Apt. Br. 23-29. He argues only that the Legislature could not have 
3
 As stated, Defendant was convicted of class A misdemeanor assault, 
which was enhanced to a third degree felony because it "was committed in 
concert with two or more persons." R. 1-4,52; R. 149:231; Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-203.1. Defendant does not challenge the enhancement on appeal. 
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intended that such a "slight" facial scar would amount to substantial bodily 
injury. Apt. Br. 24, 27, 29. The plain language of the statute rebuts this claim. 
A court's "primary goal in construing statutory language is to give effect 
to 'the true intent and purpose of the Legislature,' and the best tool for doing so 
is generally the plain language of the statute itself." Miller v. State, 2010 UT App 
25, f 12, 226 P.3d 743 (quoting State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, | 8, 52 P.3d 1276 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Accord Davis v. Provo City Coiy., 2008 UT 
59, Tf 13,193 P.3d 86. "When examining the statutory language [courts] assume 
the legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary 
meaning." Martinez, 2002 UT 80, 1 8, 52 P.3d 1276. In determining this 
meaning, "a statutory provision should be read literally." State v. Jeffries, 2009 
UT 57, If 7, 217 P.3d 265. Furthermore, Utah courts have "a long history of 
relying on dictionary definitions to determine plain meaning." State v. Redd, 
1999 UT 108, If 11, 992 P.2d 986. 
Class A misdemeanor assault requires that "the [defendant] cause[] 
substantial bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(3)(a). The 
statute defines "[substantial bodily injury" as "bodily injury, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary 
disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(12) (emphasis added). Based on 
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the evidence before the jury, the statutory term at issue here is "temporary 
disfigurement/' 
The statute itself does not define "temporary disfigurement." Black's Law 
Dictionary, however, defines "temporary" as "[l]asting for a short time only; 
existing or continuing for a limited (usu. short) time; transitory." Id. at 1504 (8th 
ed. 2004). Black's defines "disfigurement" as "[a]n impairment or injury to the 
appearance of a person or thing." Id. at 501. By including the term "temporary" 
in the statutory language, the Legislature revealed its intent to encompass the 
types of injuries that might eventually fully heal. Thus, giving the statutory 
language its plain, ordinary meaning, the "two or three inch[]" scar on Thomas' 
face was, at a minimum, the kind of "transitory" "impairment or injury to the 
appearance of a person" contemplated by the Legislature. R. 148:68. 
Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of 
"substantial bodily injury." 
B. The plain language of the statute does not require that the 
temporary disfigurement be "considerable." 
Defendant asserts that the two-to-three-inch facial scar suffered by the 
victim was, at most, minimal. He contends that the Legislature could not have 
intended that such a scar be "substantial" bodily injury. Aplt. Br. 29. He 
reaches this conclusion by comparing the definitions of "bodily injury," 
required for class B misdemeanor assault, "substantial bodily injury," required 
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for class A misdemeanor assault, and "serious bodily injury," required for 
second-degree felony aggravated assault. Aplt. Br. 15-23. A comparison of 
these statutory terms, however, shows that the victim's facial scar was precisely 
the kind of injury the Legislature intended to fall within the "substantial bodily 
injury" element of class A misdemeanor assault. 
1. "Substantial bodily injury" versus "serious bodily injury" 
As applied in this case, class A misdemeanor assault requires a showing 
that the defendant committed, "with unlawful force or violence," an act that 
caused "substantial bodily injury to" the victim. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
102(1)(a) and (3)(a). "Substantial bodily injury" is further defined as "bodily 
injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted 
physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(12) 
(emphasis added). 
Second-degree felony aggravated assault, however, requires a showing 
that the defendant "causes serious bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-103(1)(a). '"Serious bodily injury' means bodily injury that creates or 
causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(11) (emphasis added). 
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Defendant contends that the only difference between " disfigurement" 
under "substantial" and "serious" bodily injury is that the former is 
"temporary," while the latter must be "permanent." Aplt. Br. 19 (citing Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-1-601(11) & (12)). Thus, Defendant argues, "[t]o the extent the 
cut here could qualify as 'disfigurement' for purposes of '[substantial bodily 
injury/ the injury likewise could qualify as '[s]erious bodily injury' in a case 
where the scar was permanent." Aplt. Br. 29. In other words, Defendant argues 
that any scar, no matter how slight, can qualify someone for second-degree 
felony aggravated assault merely because the scar turned out to be permanent, 
as opposed to temporary. Defendant contends that the Legislature could not 
have intended such a result. Id. 
Defendant misreads the statute. The statutorily-required element under 
"serious bodily injury" is not just "permanent disfigurement," as Defendant 
suggests. Rather, it is "serious permanent disfigurement." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-601(11) (emphasis added). In contrast, "substantial bodily injury" requires 
only "temporary disfigurement." Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-601(12). Thus, for a 
defendant to be guilty of second-degree felony aggravated assault, a jury must 
find that the defendant caused both serious and permanent disfigurement. But 
for a defendant to be guilty of class A misdemeanor assault, it is enough for the 
jury to find that the defendant inflicted a non-serious, temporary disfigurement. 
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In sum, contrary to Defendant's argument, a slight, non-serious scar can 
never be the basis for finding a defendant guilty of second-degree felony 
aggravated assault. Rather, under the plain language of the statute, such 
evidence can only support a finding of "substantial bodily injury," assuming the 
jury finds that the scar amounts to disfigurement, as necessarily happened here. 
The two assault provisions do not overlap for an additional reason. 
"Serious bodily injury," under the aggravated assault statute, must be 
"intentionally cause[d]." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(a). But "substantial 
bodily injury" may be inflicted with "recklessness." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
102 (defining the culpable mental state required if not specified in the statute). 
See also State v. Terwilleger, 2003 UT App 345U, *2 (holding that "the mens rea for 
assault... requires intent, knowledge, or recklessness . . . to establish criminal 
responsibility") (internal quotations and citation omitted). The carefully crafted 
language employed by the Legislature, therefore, purposefully distinguishes 
between class A misdemeanor assault and second-degree felony aggravated 
assault based both on the seriousness and the permanence of the disfigurement, 
as well as on the intentionality of its infliction. Here, no one claimed that the 
victim's injury was either serious or permanent. Thus, Defendant's contention 
that the same injury could fall within the meaning of both "substantial bodily 
injury" and "serious bodily injury" is incorrect. 
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2. "Substantial bodily injury" versus simple "bodily injury" 
Defendant also suggests that the cut to the victim's face amounted only to 
bodily injury, which is all that is required for class B misdemeanor assault. Aplt. 
Br. 15-18. "'Bodily injury' means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3). While the victim here 
surely suffered physical pain from the attack, the evidence showed that he 
suffered more than that. As stated, he suffered a "two or three inch[]" scar still 
visible five months after it was inflicted. R. 148:68. Had the wound healed 
quickly with no visible scarring, it would likely have been simple "bodily 
injury." But as the jury found, based on its observations of the actual scar on the 
victim's face at trial, the injury did not immediately heal. Instead, it left a visible 
facial scar, which the jury necessarily found to be disfiguring. 
The foregoing shows that the Legislature intended that attacks resulting 
in temporary disfigurement, i.e. non-serious, disfiguring injuries that do not 
immediately heal, should be punished more severely than those injuries merely 
resulting in "physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3). 
In trying to distinguish "substantial bodily injury" from simple "bodily 
injury," Defendant, in effect, invites this Court to rewrite section 76-1-601(12), by 
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inserting the word "considerable" into the statutory definition of "substantial 
bodily injury": 
"Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical 
pain, [considerable] temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. 
See Aplt. Br. 24-29 (suggesting additional requirements for the establishment of 
"substantial bodily injury"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(12). Appellate courts, 
however, are not free "to insert... a substantive [term] by judicial fiat." State v. 
Wallace, 2006 UT 86, f 9,150 P.3d 540 (quoting Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT14, ^ 16, 
133 P.3d 370 (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original). 
Moreover, the Legislature plainly did not intend for "considerable" to be 
read into the statute. As explained above, in defining aggravated assault, the 
Legislature added a modifier in the definition of "serious bodily injury": "bodily 
injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-601(11) (emphasis added). "Considerable" or "substantial," the kind of 
modifier Defendant proposes to add to "temporary disfigurement," is 
conspicuously absent from the statutory definition of "substantial bodily 
injury." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(12). The fact that the Legislature 
inserted an additional modifier into the statutory definition of "serious bodily 
injury," but did not do so in the definition of "substantial bodily injury," 
45-
confirms that the Legislature consciously omitted the modifier Defendant now 
seeks to insert in the statute. 
In short, this Court must presume that the Legislature "advisedly" 
included the modifier "serious" in the phrase "serious permanent 
disfigurement," and "in accordance with its ordinary meaning." Utah Code 
Ann. § 764-601(11); Miller, 2010 UT App 25, % 12 (quoting Martinez, 2002 UT 80 
at Tf 8) (internal quotations omitted). And because "each part or section should 
be construed in connection with every other part or section," this Court must 
likewise presume that the Legislature's omission of the modifier "substantial" or 
"considerable" from the phrase "temporary disfigurement" was equally done 
"advisedly." See State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, % 10, 203 P.3d 1000 (internal 
quotation omitted); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(12). 
C. Utah and foreign caselaw do not support Defendant's arguments. 
Defendant cites three Utah cases in support of his contention that Thomas' 
facial scar was merely "bodily injury." Aplt. Br. 15-17,27-29. But the Utah cases 
Defendant cites dealt with different statutory schemes than the one at issue here. 
Defendant's reliance on them is therefore misplaced. 
In all three cases, the defendants were convicted under Utah's aggravated 
burglary statute. See State v. Young, 559 P.2d 541,542 (Utah 1977) (the defendant 
"did cause physical injury to the [victim] in that the blow to the face stunned 
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him which satisfies the requirement of" the aggravated burglary statute); State v. 
Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984) (cuts and bruises suffered by the victim 
resulted in the kind of "physical pain that [was] precisely the type of 'physical 
injury' contemplated by the [aggravated burglary] statute")4; State v. Boone, 820 
P.2d 930,937 (Utah App. 1991) ("significant 'trauma' to [the victim's] face" was 
sufficient to support jury's finding "that defendant caused 'bodily injury'" 
under the aggravated burglary statute). One alternative element under the 
aggravated burglary statute is that the crime "[c]ause[] physical injury . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(1)(a) (1975). The term "physical injury," as used in 
the aggravated burglary statute, was given the same definition by the Peterson 
Court as "bodily injury" under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3), at issue in the 
present case. Id. at 1219. 
But unlike the assault statute at issue here, the aggravated burglary 
statute contained no "substantial bodily injury" element, or its equivalent. 
Consequently, while "bodily injury" under the assault statute implies an injury 
not amounting to "substantial bodily injury," no such ceiling exists for the term 
"physical injury" under the aggravated burglary statute. Thus, any injury, no 
matter how serious, would be simple "physical injury," or "bodily injury," for 
4
 Though the assault statute was also at issue in Peterson, "physical injury" 
was applied in that case under the aggravated burglary statute. Id. at 1219. 
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purposes of aggravated burglary. As a result, the cited cases offer no help in 
defining the line between simple "bodily injury" and "substantial bodily 
injury," as used in Utah's assault statute. 
Moreover, in such a fact-specific analysis, whether or not other types of 
injuries might also amount to "bodily injury" does not answer the question here: 
whether a visible facial scar amounts to "temporary disfigurement." 
The foreign cases Defendant cites are equally unhelpful because they 
involve different statutory schemes. See Aplt. Br. 28. For example, both Bolton v. 
State, 619 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) and People v. Durham, 312 111. App. 
3d 413 (2000), 727 N.E.2d 623, involve statutes comparable to Utah's aggravated 
burglary statute, in that one standard applies to all severities of injury. Compare 
Bolton (quoting V.T.C. A., Penal Code § 22.01 in which "bodily injury" is the only 
severity of injury listed as an element of assault) and Durham (citing 7201.L.C.S. 
5/12-3(a), the Illinois battery statute, with the same result) with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-203(1) (a) (bodily injury the only severity of injury listed as an element of 
aggravated burglary). Thus, a severe and permanent disfigurement suffered 
during an assault in Texas, or during a battery in Illinois, would constitute 
bodily injury in both states. Because neither state has a comparable "substantial 
bodily injury" standard, their characterization of an injury as a simple bodily 
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injury is, once again, unhelpful in determining the scope of "bodily injury" and 
"substantial bodily injury" under Utah's assault statute. 
Likewise, in Kelly v. State, 2007 WY 45 (2007), 153 P.3d 926, the defendant 
was convicted of aggravated assault and battery. Id. at % 1. Wyoming's 
aggravated assault and battery statute, much like Utah's, requires a showing of 
"serious bodily injury," including, in the alternative, "severe disfigurement." Id. 
at f t 7-8 (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-502(a)(i) and 6-l-104(a)(x)). As 
discussed above, the "temporary disfigurement" requirement under the Utah 
assault statute employs no modifying language in defining the gravity of the 
required disfigurement. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(12). Thus, Kelly, too, is 
inapposite. 
D. Alternatively, even if the victim's facial scar did not constitute 
"substantial bodily injury," modification of the judgment would 
be the proper remedy. 
Alternatively, even if this Court were to conclude that the victim did not, 
as a matter of law, suffer "substantial bodily injury," reversal would not be 
warranted, as Defendant suggests. Aplt. Br. 30 (arguing that reversal is the 
default remedy). Instead, as Defendant himself admits, this Court could vacate 
or modify the judgment, and reduce his conviction by one degree. Id. 
In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1209 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court 
relied on its "general power to modify criminal judgments on appeal" to 
-19-
conclude that "when a defendant is convicted of an offense but an error 
occurred at trial," an appellate court "has the power to enter judgment for a 
lesser included offense rather than ordering a retrial." The Court explained that 
before it could exercise this power, it would have to show that "(i) the trier of 
fact necessarily found facts sufficient to constitute the lesser offense, and (ii) the 
error did not affect these findings." Id. at 12094210. 
Here, "the jury necessarily found every fact required for [class B 
misdemeanor assault] beyond a reasonable doubt in returning a guilty verdict 
under the [class A misdemeanor assault] instruction it was given." Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1211. The jury, here, was effectively instructed that it must find all 
elements of class B misdemeanor assault in determining if defendant inflicted 
the type of injury required for class A misdemeanor assault: 
[Y]ou must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, all the following elements: 
3. Defendant, Frankie Arnold White; 
4. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly; 
5. 
(A) Did attempt, with unlawful force or violence to 
do bodily injury to Dexter Thomas; OR 
(B) Did threaten, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence to do bodily injury 
to Dexter Thomas; OR 
(C) Did commit an act, with unlawful force or 
violence, that caused bodily injury to Dexter 
Thomas or created a substantial risk of bodily 
injury to Dexter Thomas; AND 
6. Caused substantial bodily injury to Dexter Thomas. 
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R. 105. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (elements of assault). Thus, "[t]he 
statutory elements for [class B misdemeanor assault] are incorporated in the . . . 
instruction given to the jury/7 Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1212. Because the jury found 
Defendant guilty of class A misdemeanor assault, "it necessarily found every 
fact required to convict [Defendant] of" class B misdemeanor assault, satisfying 
the first Dunn requirement. See Id. 
The second Dunn requirement, that "neither [Defendant] nor the State is 
unfairly prejudiced by" a modification of Defendant's sentence, id; at 1212, is 
also satisfied. In his brief, Defendant correctly points out that neither party 
sought entry of a conviction on a class B misdemeanor assault at trial. Aplt. Br. 
at 30. But the same was true in Dunn. See Id. at 1208. Defendant fails to show 
how he would be prejudiced any more than Dunn by a reduction in the level of 
his conviction. Moreover, "this procedure does not deprive the defendant of his 
right to have a trial judge or jury decide on the proof of the elements of the 
lesser and included offense, but rather recognizes that the trier of fact has already 
made that decision." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1212 n.8 (quoting State v. Byrd, 385 So.2d 
248, 252 (La. 1980)) (emphasis added in Dunn). 
Consequently, should this Court hold that the two-to-three-inch facial scar 
inflicted upon the victim does not constitute "substantial bodily injury," 
reduction from class A misdemeanor assault to class B misdemeanor assault, not 
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outright reversal, would be the appropriate remedy. The unchallenged "in 
concert" enhancement provision, however, would still apply, thereby rendering 
Defendant guilty of a class A misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm Defendant's 
conviction. 
Respectfully submitted on 7 October 2010, 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
LAURA B. DUPAIX ; 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Statutes 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-5-102 
Assault 
(1 ) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury 
to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2 ) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3 ) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4 ) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury 
to another. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-5-103 
Aggravated Assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses 
a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-1-601 
Definitions 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1 ) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2 ) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal 
action. 
(3 ) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 
condition. 
(4 ) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5 ) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item, if: 
( i ) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim 
to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury; or 
( i i ) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner 
that he is in control of such an item. 
(6 ) "Grievous sexual offense" means: 
(a) rape, Section 76-5-402; 
(b) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1; 
(c) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2; 
(d) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3: 
(e) forcible sodomy, Subsection 76-5-403(2); 
( f ) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; 
(g) aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Subsection 76-5-404.1(4); 
(h ) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405; 
( i ) any felony attempt to commit an offense described in Subsections 
(6)(a) through (h); or 
( j ) an offense in another state, territory, or district of the United States that, if 
committed in Utah, would constitute an offense described in Subsections (6)(a) 
through (i). 
(7 ) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(8 ) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor 
is capable of acting. 
(9 ) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, 
partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(10) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or 
control over tangible property. 
(11) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
(12) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily 
injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, 
or temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. 
(13) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic 
storage or transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing 
information in a form capable of being preserved. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-3-203.1 
Offenses committed in concert with two or more persons-Notice-Enhanced 
penalties 
(1 ) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is subject to an 
enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3) if the trier of fact 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with two or 
more persons. 
(b ) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the 
defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing 
the offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged, and each of the 
other persons: 
( i ) was physically present; or 
( i i ) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4). 
(c) For purposes of Subsection ( l ) (b)( i i ) : 
( i ) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to 
engage in the same offense or degree of offense as the defendant; and 
( i i ) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a party 
if he were an adult. 
(2 ) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall cause to 
be subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
(3 ) The enhanced penalty for a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b ) class A misdemeanor Is a third degree felony; 
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(d ) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and 
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than five years 
in addition to the statutory minimum prison term for the offense, and which may 
be for life. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a ) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding 
drug-related offenses; 
(b ) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1, Assault and 
Related Offenses; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2, Criminal 
Homicide; 
(d ) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3, 
Kidnapping, Trafficking, and Smuggling; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses; 
( f ) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g ) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1, Property 
Destruction; 
(h ) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Part 2, Burglary and Criminal Trespass; 
( i ) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3, Robbery; 
( j ) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4, Theft, or Part 6, 
Retail Theft; 
( k ) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6-
504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6-512, 
76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520; 
( I ) any offense of obstructing government operations under Title 76, Chapter 8, 
Part 3, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 
76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n ) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-
509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3, Explosives; 
(p ) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons; 
(q ) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 10, Part 12, Pornographic and Harmful Materials and Performances; 
( r ) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13, 
Prostitution; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
( t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and Currency 
Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that the 
persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, 
apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged 
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
